Background: Cruise ships carry a large number of people in confined spaces with relative
Introduction
Cruise ships carry a large number of people in confined spaces with relative homogeneous mixing over a period of time that is longer than for any other mode of transportation. 1 Thus, cruise ships present a unique environment for transmission of human-to-human transmitted infections. The association of acute respiratory infections (ARI) incidence in passengers is statistically significant with season, destination and duration of travel. 2 In February 2012, an outbreak of respiratory illness occurred on the cruise ship off Brazil, resulting in 16 hospitalizations due to severe ARI and one death. 3 In May 2020, a dual outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and influenza A (H3N2) on a cruise ship occurred: of 1,970 passengers and 734 crew members, 82 (3.0%) were infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, and 98 (3.6%) with influenza A (H3N2) virus. 4 Four subsequent cases were epidemiologically linked to passengers but no evidence of sustained transmission to the community or passengers on the next cruise was reported. 4 In September 2000 an outbreak of influenza-like illness was reported on a cruise ship sailing off the Australian coast with over 1,100 passengers and 400 crew on board, coinciding with the peak influenza period in Sydney. 5 The cruise morbidity was high with 40 passengers hospitalized, two of whom died. A total of 310 passengers (37%) reported suffering from an influenza-like illness.
In December 2019, a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, emerged in Wuhan, China and rapidly spread within China and then to various global cities with high interconnectivity with China. 6, 7 The resulting ARI due to this coronavirus, a disease now coined COVID-19, is thought to be mainly transmitted by respiratory droplets from infected people. The mean serial interval of COVID-19 is 7.5 days (95% CI, 5.3 to 19) and the initial estimate for the basic reproductive number was 2.2 (95% CI, 1.4 to 3.9), 8 although higher have since been reported with a mean of more than 3. 9 approximately 10 days after initial onset of symptoms. [11] [12] [13] 14 Evidence is mounting that also mildly symptomatic or even asymptomatic cases can transmit the disease. 15, 16 On 3 rd February, 2020, an outbreak of COVID-19 was reported on Cruise Ship Princess Diamond off the Japanese coast, with initially 10 persons confirmed to be infected with the virus. The number has since ballooned into the largest coronavirus outbreak outside of mainland China. By 19 th February, 619 of 3,700 passengers and crew (17%) were tested positive. By end February, six persons had died.
The outbreak was traced to a Hong Kong passenger who embarked on January 21st and disembarked on January 25th. After docking near New Taipei City, on January 31, the ship arrived in Yokohoma, Japan. By the following day, the Japanese health ministry ordered a 14-day quarantine for everyone on board and rushed to close its ports to all other cruise ships. The public health measures taken according to news reports and the media were removal of all PCR positive passengers and crew from the ship and their isolation in Japanese hospitals. The remaining test-negative passengers and crew remained on board. Passengers were quarantined in their cruise ship cabins, and only allowed out of the cabin for one hour per day. By 20 th February, the decision to evacuate was made and more than 3000 passengers left the ship. Most were air-evacuated by their respective countries. 10
The cruise ship with a COVID-19 index case onboard between the 21-25 th January serves as a good model to study its potential to spread in a population that is more homogenously mixed, compared to the more spatially variable situation in Wuhan.
We set out to study the empirical data of COVID-19 confirmed infections on the Cruise ship Diamond 
Methods:
We used data on confirmed cases on the cruise ship as published on a daily basis by public sources 17, 18 to calibrate a model and estimate the basic reproduction number from the time sequence and amplitude of the case rates observed. COVID-19 is thought to have been introduced by an index case from Hong Kong visiting the ship between the 21 st to 25 th of January, 2020. We thus used the date of 21 st January 2020 as the first time point, t=0, assuming the index case was infectious from the first day on the ship. The estimates of and the associated Covid-19 incidence on the cruise ship was derived using a compartmental model estimating the dynamics of the number of susceptible ( ), exposed ( ), infected ( ), and recovered ( ) individuals, adapted but modified from a published COVID-19 study. 19 We analyzed two instances of the model assuming respectively: (1) a homogenous population (3700 individuals), and (2) a stratified population of crew (1000 individuals) and guests (2700 individuals).
The model used a relationship between the daily reproductive number, , and to infer the transmissibility and contact rate across the whole cruise ship population by the relationship:
where the infectious period equals to one over the recovery rate ( ), In the homogeneous model, the infectious period, i, of COVID-19 was set to be 10 days based on previous findings. 8 In the situation of no removal (ill persons taken off the ship to be isolated in a Japanese hospital), the incubation period (or, the latent period), was estimated to be approximately 5 days (ranging from 2 to 14 days). 20 In order to model the removal/isolation and quarantine interventions, we implemented time dependent removal and contact rates as described in Table 1 . We performed additional sensitivity analysis reducing the to 3.7, an estimate of the average value across mainland China studies of COVID-19. 9 We further estimated a counterfactual scenario of the infections dynamics assuming no interventions were implemented, in particular no removal and subsequent isolation of ill persons. We assumed an infectious period of 10 days, with a contact rate remaining the same as in the initial phase of the outbreak. Additionally, in the stratified model of crew and guests, the contact rate was assumed to be different due to the assumption that crew could not be easily quarantined as they had to continue their services on board for all the passengers and possibly had more homogeneous mixing with all the passengers, whereas passengers may be mixing more within their preferred circles and areas. We kept the transient change in the contact rate and the removal of all PCR confirmed patients starting from the 3 nd and the 5 th of February respectively as in the first model. Parameters are described in Table 1 .
The model describing a homogeneous population onboard can be described by:
where denote all susceptible people on the cruise ship, all exposed, all infected and all recovered or removed, and where denotes the whole population.
The model describing a stratified population onboard can be described by:
where denotes susceptible, exposed, infected and recovered or removed, , and the subscript and are indicating guest and crew respectively. Overall, we assume mortality is negligible. Table 1 are the results of the calibration to the observed cumulative incidence data. The contact rate between persons on the cruise ship was calibrated to give the best fit to data with a reduction of 70% The predicted cumulative number of cases over time from this model described the observed cases well, but overestimated the cumulative case incidence rate initially ( Figure 2 ). This allowed to compensate for reporting bias in the initial phase, given that the proportion of testing of all passengers was patchy while at the end of the study (19 th February, 2020 (Figure 2) .
In a sensitivity analysis we modified the to 3.7 (and consequently ) as this has been reported the average basic reproduction number from studies of COVID-19 in China. 9 However, from our simulation, even in the absence of any intervention, such a low cannot explain the rapid growth of incident cases on the cruise ship ( Figure 3 ). This sensitivity scenario excluded countermeasures from the model making it unrealistic that such a low value could be the true value in the cruise ship situation with confined spaces and high homogeneous mixing of the same persons. The estimate with the lower value also omitted to consider the strong interventions put into place, making it even more unrealistic.
We additionally modeled a scenario stratified by crew and guests whereby we assumed the parameter values of transmission risk to be lower for crew to guest than for guest to crew ( Table 1) Instead of keeping all passengers on board, another option would have been to evacuate all individuals onboard the cruise ship earlier, and allow them to go home for a potential quarantine in their respective home countries. We modeled that an evacuation by 3 rd February, 2020, would have resulted in 76 latent cases (cases during the incubation time), while an evacuation by 19 th February would have resulted in 246 latent cases.
Discussion:
Modelling the COVID-19 on-board outbreak reveals important insights into the epidemic risk and effectiveness of public health measures. We found that the reproductive number of COVID-19 in the cruise ship situation of 3,700 persons confined to a limited space was around 4 times higher than in the epicenter in Wuhan, where was estimated to have a mean of 3.7. 9 Interestingly, a rough estimation of the population per square km on this 18-deck ship is 286 by 62 meters (0.32 km 2 ). Assuming that only 50% of decks are being used, approximately 24,400 persons are confined per km 2 on a ship compared to approximately 6000 persons per km 2 (9,000,000/1528) in urban Wuhan. This means that the population density was about 4 times higher on the cruise ship. Thus, both R 0 and contact rate are dependent on population density, as also suggested by previous research. 21 In population-based models on observational data the population per square km is often substantially different, affecting the R 0 and coefficient implicitly by changes in the contact rate expressed as:
The local estimate of R 0 can be divided into a localized contact rate and a multiplier that is necessary for moving from one population to another:
, where pd is the population density multiplier. In our case it was approximated to 4. Here the contact rate is relating to a contact rate in a defined population in a certain area and the population density multiplier modifies the contact rate when moving across different local population and geographical areas representing heterogeneity in population density. In the case of the cruise ship, the potential relationship of to population density appear thus mainly be attributed to the contact rate and mixing effects. This information is also important for other settings characterized by high population densities.
With such a high , we estimated that without any interventions within the time period of 21 st January to 19 th February 2920 out of the 3700 (79%) would have been infected, assuming relatively homogenous mixing between all people on board.
The quarantine and removal interventions launched when the outbreak was confirmed (3 rd February and 5 th of February) substantially lowered the contact rate and reduced the cumulative case burden by an estimated 2307 cases by 19 th February. We note, however, that the longer time span of simulation beyond 19 th February, assuming people would stay on the boat, would reduce the net effect of the intervention substantially. We further note that an earlier evacuation would have corresponded to disembarking a substantially lower number of latent undetectable infections (76 vs. 246), likely giving rise to some further transmission outside the ship.
We also found that contact rate of guest to guest and crew appeared higher than the contact rate from guest to crew, perhaps driven by high transmission rates within cabins. However, testing of crew was delayed, and there was a testing bias towards testing more passengers than crew. Hence our access to empiric data may have and this analysis need to be revisited when all data is available.
The limitations of our study include our lack of data on the lag time between onset of symptoms, the timing of testing and potential delay to the availability of test results. Due to the large number of people, not everyone was tested, and we suspect that the timing of the test results do not totally tally with real-time onset of cases. We had no access to data on incident cases in crew versus passengers, nor any data on whether there was clustering of cases around certain nationalities or crew members.
Furthermore, although the Hong Kong passenger was assumed to be the index case, it could well have been possible that there was more than one index case on board who could have contributed to transmission, and this would have lowered our estimated R0. Lastly, our models are based on human-to-human transmission and do not take into account the possibility that fomites, or water systems with infected feces, contributed to the outbreak. In conclusion, the cruise ship conditions clearly amplified an already highly transmissible disease.
is related to population density, and is particularly driven by contact rate and mixing effects, and this explains the high in the first weeks before countermeasures were initiated. Population densities and mixing need to be taken into account in future modeling of the COVID-19 outbreak in different settings. Early evacuation of all passengers on a cruise ship-a situation with confined spaces and high intermixing-is recommended as soon as an outbreak of COVID-19 is confirmed. Observed total case numbers of total (black), crew (blue) and guest (grey) are marked as "o".
